The Building Society Act, 1986, allowed British building societies to convert from mutual to plc bank status -quoted on the stock market. Seven mutuals converted in the period 1995 to 2000. This study examines the pricing behaviour of the converted mutuals and remaining building societies to address the question of whether a change in ownership structure caused managers of the new stock banks to place profit/shareholder concerns ahead of the interests of the customer/owners of mutual building societies. The results of an econometric study using monthly interest rate data (1995-2001) on deposit products and mortgages confirm that managers began to set prices which would improve profits, at the expense of depositors and mortgagees. Deposit/mortgage rates were found to be permanently lower/higher post conversion, the converts responded more rapidly to changes in the market rate of interest, and the new banks offered proportionately more rip-offs than the remaining building societies.
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The Effect of UK Building Society Conversion on Pricing Behaviour
Introduction
Dating back to the 18 th century, UK building societies have a long history in British retail finance. Members of a society paid subscriptions, and once there was enough funding, a selection procedure determined the member who would receive funds for house purchase or building. The early societies were attached to licensed premises (e.g. the Golden Cross Inn in Birmingham, 1775) and were wound up after all members had paid for their houses. The first legislation on them was passed in 1836 1 . In 1845, the permanent societies, such as the Chesham Building Society emerged. Members kept a share (deposit) account at a society and could, after a period of time, expect to be granted a mortgage. Over time, depositors and mortgagees were not necessarily from the same group 2 . As mutual organisations, every customer (depositor or borrower) has a share in the society, with the right to vote on key managerial changes. Each vote has the same weight, independent of the size of the deposit or loan.
In 1984, an informal but effective cartel linking the building societies dissolved after Abbey National broke ranks. By this time, many of the larger societies saw the "big four 3 " and other banks as their main competitors. The Building Societies Act (1986) allowed building societies to offer a full range retail banking products typical of a bank. However, there were important restrictions: 90% of a building society's assets had to be residential mortgages and wholesale money plus deposits could not exceed 20% of liabilities, subsequently raised to 40%, then 50%.
The 1986 Act also gave building societies an option to convert to public limited company (plc) or bank status. Two-thirds of a building society's "shareholders" (each with one vote) had to approve conversion, and the new bank was licensed by the Bank of England 4 . The Act protected converted building societies from take-over for a period of five years, unless the majority of shareholders voted in favour of such take-overs. In 1989, Abbey National was the first building society to become a bank and more conversions followed. The details are summarised in table 1. The conversions between 1995 and 1997 resulted in two-thirds of the assets being transferred out of the sector. The 1997 Building Societies Act amended parts of the 1986 Act, giving greater protection to the remaining, albeit dwindling, building society group. Any converted society attempting a hostile take-over of an existing mutual lost the five year protection. In place of the prescriptive 1986 Act was a proscriptive approach: building societies could undertake all forms of banking, unless explicitly prohibited. However, at least 75% of their assets must be secured by residential property, and 50% of funding has to come from shareholder deposits.
It has been argued that managers of building societies can build up reserves or earn a smaller margin on loans and deposits because they do not have to maximise profits, service external capital, or pay dividends to shareholders. Instead, their objective is to maximise the utility of their customer-shareholders. Each building society shareholder has only one vote, making it more difficult to co-ordinate shareholder action to exert influence on managerial decision making. By contrast, the manager of a plc bank is answerable to shareholders. Shareholders are not necessarily customers and their voting power increases with the percentage of shares held. Hence profit maximisation is the key objective. Williamson (1963 Williamson ( , 1971 ) was one of many authors to explore the phenomenon of expense preference behaviour, whereby managers (with discretion to do so) maximise their own utility through bigger salaries and bonuses, increasing the number of staff reporting to them, company cars, lavish offices, etc. Earlier, Baumol (1958) had proposed total revenue maximisation subject to a minimum profit constraint as a more plausible hypothesis than profit maximisation for non-owner managed companies. According to Manne (1965) , managers of publicly limited companies are subject to monitoring by the announcement of quarterly and annual results, which provide performance-related information.
There is some literature on managerial incentives in mutual and shareholder owned (stock) organisations. Fama and Jensen (1983) note the effects of diluted ownership which prevails in mutuals, making control of managers more difficult than in stock firms. Jensen and Meckling (1996) , among others, argued that compensation packages which include share ownership improves incentives for managers to act in the interest of their shareholders. Barnes (1983) applied discriminant analysis to 59 UK building societies to test the hypothesis that a divorce between ownership and control can explain periods of low profitability. He concluded that expense preference and growth policies (measured by a managerial expense ratio and branch network expansion, respectively) did explain lower profitability. But Valnek (1999) investigated the performance of 17 building societies and plc "retail" 5 banks in the UK for the period 1983-1993. Using a variety of measures, he showed that the mutuals outperformed the banks, and suggested this was due to owners and depositors being one and the same, thus avoiding costly agency conflicts and gaining from the efficiency associated with a homogeneous clientele.
However, agency problems are present, whatever the ownership structure. It means the interests of the customer-shareholder (building societies) or shareholder (banks) may be undermined by the manager trying to maximise his or her utility. In both cases, the source of the problem is asymmetric information, where the manager has more information about the daily operation and position of the firm. Nonetheless, it is likely that the managers will be more accountable in a stock company, given that they are bound by some minimum profit constraint, since shareholders can sell their shares. The constraint on the building society manager is less pronounced because depositors/mortgagees, with less information and higher switching costs 6 , are less likely to move their accounts elsewhere.
The majority of conversions were initiated by building society management, which would suggest they believed they could be gain more as a bank 7
. They probably thought that increased status, the potential for higher bonuses, etc. would more than compensate for any increased accountability to shareholders.
Customers and shareholders are one and the same for managers of building societies, but once they convert to bank status, a wedge is driven between them.
Once profits, rather than customer utility, becomes the maximand, converts' deposit and loan rates should respond more quickly to a change in the market rate of interest. In addition, the margins earned by converts should be higher than the remaining building societies. The objective of this study is to assess, whether post conversion, pricing behaviour changed in such a way that favours shareholders more than customers.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two describes the data and methodology, section three discusses the main findings, and section four concludes.
Methodology
To compare the pricing behaviour of converted building societies and mutuals, monthly interest rates were obtained on 90 day term deposits, instant deposits (can be withdrawn with no penalty), chequing accounts (a current account paying interest 6 Shares can be sold with relative ease; switching accounts is more difficult, especially for customers with mortgages. 7 The Bradford and Bingley converted against management advice, due to the influence of "carpetbaggers" -new members of a society who invest in it to force a vote on conversion and thus make a windfall gain. Members of the Nationwide and Britannia building societies followed management advice and voted against conversion, despite carpetbagger attempts to have them converted.
with a cheque book and debit card) and variable rate mortgages. another reason why it is important to include as many building societies as possible.
8 Any building society which catered exclusively to a particular community was excluded. 9 A building society (or convert) may have offered a product (e.g. chequing account, mortgage) but had to be excluded either because the bank/building society has not reported the rates to Money£acts, or the period for which the data were available was too short. Money£acts reports annual interest rates at monthly frequencies by tiers, i.e. £1, £100, £500, £1000, £10,000, and so on. To avoid a potential time bias 10 from the use of tier rates, statistics from the British Bankers Association were used to obtain annual average deposit levels for the instant, term, and chequing accounts. The full details of the computations appear in 
R ij = the rate of interest paid by firm i in month j on the product; an annual rate sampled at a monthly frequency. LIBOR i : the three month £ London interbank rate in month j LIBOR i-j LIBOR i lagged by j months, j=1,2,3 MOS: the number of months since a building society converted from the date of the last interest rate entry, December, 2001. TT: time trend. ε: error term.
Preliminary co-integration exercises, using the Johansen maximum likelihood procedure, established the presence a unit root and captured the dynamics of retail deposit and loan rates to changes in a base rate. For this reason, LIBOR (a proxy for the market rate of interest) lagged up to three months was considered more than sufficient to capture any lags in the adjustment to a change in LIBOR. Unless otherwise stated, there were 84 observations for each financial institution (FI)
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The reasonably large sample size made it possible to run individual regressions for each bank or building society. The data were also pooled across all firms, for each product, to increase the degrees of freedom.
Econometric Results
There If the coefficient appears in bold, it means the p-statistic indicated significance at the 99% level of confidence; a * beside a coefficient means it is significant at the 95% level of confidence.
Pricing Behaviour
Using the results from the preferred estimation of equation (1) The coefficient on current LIBOR shows how quickly a convert or mutual responds to a change in LIBOR. Table A3 shows the current LIBOR is significant in 7 of the 9 cases for converts, but only 5 out of 20 for non-converts. 15 of the 20 mutuals have a significant LIBOR lagged by 3 months, in contrast to only 5 of the 9 newly converted banks. Also, all the building societies have a 3 month lagged LIBOR with a significant coefficient, but only 4 of the 9 converts do. The pattern is repeated for the other products -a much higher proportion of converts have a significant current LIBOR than mutuals; it is especially pronounced for instant high, the chequing accounts and mortgages. This finding suggests that typically, the converted banks react faster to a change in LIBOR than the mutuals, which is what would be expected if the converted building societies were more concerned about satisfying shareholders.
However, other factors must be considered to complete the picture on pricing behaviour. It is important to look at the sum of the significant LIBOR coefficients ( ∑L in tables A2 to A8). In the absence of a significant constant term, the closer this figure is to unity, the more competitive the product is, and firms in this category are long run non-smoothers, because given time, they adjust the deposit or mortgage rates in line with changes in LIBOR. Some firms however, react more quickly than others. A relatively low ∑L means that a FI's total response to changing market rates is small. By contrast, firms with a high ∑L show greater sensitivity to changes in LIBOR, meaning their deposit rate moves, sooner or later, in line with the market rate of interest. A significant constant term suggests a different type of pricing behaviour. It means the convert or mutual does react to a change in LIBOR, but also engages in marking up or down the deposit rate. Looking at the results in tables A2-A8, it is usually the case that there is an inverse relationship between the size of the constant term, if significant, and ∑L. Looking at all the deposit products together, roughly the same proportion of mutuals and converts engage in marking up or down, and it is the exception rather than the rule for term high deposits and both cheque products. For term low and instant deposits at least a half, if not more, of the FIs had significant constant terms suggesting a considerable degree of marking up/down. Also, though it is often the same firms engaging in this type of pricing behaviour across the products, this is not always so. There is a striking variation in pricing behaviour among the banks and building societies.
Turning to the repayment mortgages (table A8) , nearly all the building societies and new converts have positive and significant constant terms. The higher the coefficient on the constant term, the lower the ∑L coefficient, indicating it is the norm for these firms to mark up the mortgage rate.
The time trend coefficient when significant, tends to be negative. The pooled regressions have a negative and significant coefficient on the time trend for all but two deposit products (cheque low and term high), confirming the deposit rates tended to fall over the period. For the individual firm equations, a significantly negative time trend is the norm for no-notice and term high deposits, and a much higher proportion of converts have negative signs. A minority of firms, both convert and mutuals, have significantly positive coefficients for term low, the chequing accounts, and instant low.
These results are further evidence of differences in pricing behaviour over the period, and therefore, a substantial departure from what would be expected in a highly competitive market.
For the mortgage (pooled) regression, the time trend does not appear in the preferred equation. The individual regressions show a significantly negative time trend coefficient, for virtually all the converts but about half the mutuals, meaning the mortgage rate fell over the period.
Summarising the key findings so far, first, the mutuals respond to a change in LIBOR more slowly. However, there is little to distinguish between the two groups when it comes to firms using mark-ups/downs to offset their responsiveness to a change in LIBOR. The extent of marking up or down appears to be associated with the type of product rather than the firm. But these findings confirm that the pre-1984 cartel days, when just one rate was set by all building societies, are long gone. There is strong evidence of firms adopting different pricing strategies, as shown by the variation in the size of the constant term, the speed/degree of response to a change in LIBOR, and the time trend coefficients.
Months Since Conversion
Pooling greatly increases the number of observations available for each of the products. It also permits a further test of how the number of months since a mutual converted to a bank influences pricing behaviour. This captures the idea that managerial behaviour will not necessarily change overnight; any change in the converts' culture will take time. Three non-linear functional forms were used to test
If the coefficients are found to be significant, it would confirm that rate setting behaviour adopted in the early months of conversion diminished over time. A linear version is also tested; if significant it would indicate there is no change the way interest rates are set over the period.
Referring to the MOS columns in tables A2 through A8, one of the concave specifications generally outperformed the linear version. In the pooled regression, the functional form of [1/(1+MOS)] is significant and did better than the other specifications for all the products but cheque low
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. A rectangular hyperbola, it is convex and decreasing in the months since conversion. The term is really an expanded dummy: unity for pre and non-converts, and tending to zero for banks which converted a very long time ago, such as Abbey National. Its significance implies a straightforward conversion path during the transition, capturing the idea that most of the effect of the conversion shows up early on, to be followed by ever diminishing subsequent effects. The variable has a value of one for mutuals and preconverts, but post conversion, it declines to ½ after one month, 1/3 after 2 months , ¼ after 3 months and so on, falling asymptotically to zero. Thus, over 90% of the adjustment to the long run rate occurs within a year.
The coefficient on [1/(1+MOS)] is also used to assess the overall effect of conversion on deposit and mortgage rates. Table 3 summarises how conversion has affected rate setting behaviour. Compared to mutuals, the converts' deposit rate ends up permanently lower; mortgage rates permanently higher. For example, depositors at a convert holding a cheque high account will find that within a year of converting, there is a permanent drop of 1.1% in the deposit rate, which is 90% complete. To summarise, post-conversion, the new banks reduced their deposit rates by as much as 1.2%, and raised the mortgage rate by 0.2%. 
Bargains and Ripoffs
The terms "bargain" and "rip-off" originate from a theoretical model developed by Salop and Stiglitz (1977) . In their model, consumers face unseen information costs. The size of the differences in the margins of the best bargain and worst rip-off varies considerably among the products. The difference between the best bargain and worst rip-off is just 0.51% for mortgages (table 4), rising to just over 4% for Instantlow and term-low. However, looking at the ranges alone can be misleading. For example, cheque-low has a range of just 1.17% but the margins are relatively high:
varying from under 5% to just over 6%. By contrast, the best mortgage bargain has margin is 0.99%, but the margin of the worst buy is 1.48%
Ranking the average margins (see below) shows the chequing and instant accounts have the highest margins. A number of factors explain the differences in the size of the margins for each product. Most UK banks and building societies offer repayment mortgages, which are close to being risk free because it is secured by property.
Customers seeking out a mortgage are more likely to be price sensitive and search out the best deal, because the investment, for the majority of buyers, is the largest they will make in a lifetime. Aggregating over all the products, the ratio is 2.5; so converts offer over 53% of the rip-off products, and just over a fifth (21%) of bargains.
These observations lend support to the idea that the converts are keen to earn the highest possible spreads because they are answerable to their shareholders. The building societies offer many more bargains because they are more likely to do the best for their customers, who are their shareholders
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. This point reinforces the findings reported in table 3, which showed that compared to mutuals, the new banks permanently raised deposit rates, and lowered loan rates.
Conclusion
In 1989, Abbey National was the first building society to convert to mutual status, followed by eight more between 1995 and 2000. The main purpose of this study was to assess whether the pricing behaviour of these converts was affected when profits replaced customer/shareholder utility as the maximand.
The study employed annual interest rate data (quoted at monthly frequencies) for the period 1995 to 2001, from a sample of converted building societies and mutuals. With the exception of Abbey National, some converted over the period and the rest kept their mutual status. Four products were included: term deposits, instant (no-notice) deposits, chequing accounts, and mortgages.
Most of the econometric findings indicate that stock banks became more pricesensitive post conversion, which is consistent with the expectation that the new converts became more responsive to shareholders. Converts were found to be far 20 Given the small number of observations for the two chequing products, cheque low and cheque high were aggregated to arrive at a ratio of 1.14. 21 Tables 4 and 5 show building societies offering both bargains and rip-offs. The difference is the concentration of converts in the rip-off category.
more likely to respond to a change in current LIBOR than the building societies, though there was a noticeable dispersion in all aspects of pricing behaviour for both converts and mutuals. The coefficients on the time trend showed the converts' deposit and mortgage rates were more likely to fall over the period. A regression of pooled data (across converts and mutuals) revealed that following conversion to bank status, the rates on all the convert deposit products were permanently lower; their mortgage rates permanently higher.
Applying the Salop and Stiglitiz model, all financial institutions were classified according to whether they offered bargains and rip-offs in each product category. The results showed that the new converts offered predominantly rip-off products, further evidence to support the expectation that they became more responsive to shareholders post-conversion.
